Why is voter turnout so low? Actually, we could reverse the question and ask why people vote at all. A “rational” voter (one who seeks to maximize personal benefits and minimize costs) should vote only if the costs of voting (the time and energy spent first in registering, then in informing oneself about the candidates, and finally going to the polls on Election Day) are exceeded by the expected value of having the preferred candidate win (the personal benefits to be received from the winner) multiplied by the probability that one’s own vote will be the deciding vote.⁵ But under this “rational” notion, not many people would vote: Few Americans receive direct personal and tangible benefits from the election of one candidate versus another. And most Americans know that the likelihood of one vote determining the outcome of the election is remote. Yet millions of Americans vote anyway.

In order to rescue the “rational” model, political theorists have added “the intrinsic rewards of voting” to the equation.⁶ These rewards include the ethic of voting, patriotism, a sense of duty, and allegiance to democracy. In other words, people get psychic rewards from voting itself rather than tangible benefits, and these psychic rewards do not depend on who wins or whether a single vote determines the outcome. So more people vote out of a sense of civic duty and commitment to democracy than on a purely rational basis.

For years, studies have found that the young, the poor, the unemployed, and the least educated are the least likely to vote and the most likely to feel alienated or turned off by politics.⁷ (See Table 4-1.)

Nonvoters are also more prevalent among:

• First-generation immigrants, especially non-English speaking⁸

• Those who seldom participate in organized religious activities

• Newcomers to a community⁹

• People with little or no interest in politics, little trust in government, no belief that voting is a civic duty, and no belief they can make a difference by voting

• Persons with physical disabilities¹⁰

• Blue-collar and service-sector workers

• Asians and Latinos

• Single parents living in poor neighborhoods

• Independents

• Persons who have not been contacted by a candidate or party

• Renters (vs. homeowners)

• Residents of solidly one-party dominated states (nonswing states)

Much of the variation in voter turnout among the states can be explained by the socioeconomic characteristics of their residents—their overall educational level, income, racial and ethnic mix, and age profile. For example, income and educational levels are higher, and the white population is larger, in Minnesota and Wisconsin. Turnout is much higher in these states than in many Deep South states, whose populations are poorer, less educated, younger, and more racially diverse. (Rising turnout rates among these southern states have been attributed somewhat to socioeconomic shifts—more newcomers from the North—and to federal civil rights laws and black and Hispanic voter mobilization efforts.)

Turnout tends to go up when a voter feels his or her vote can truly make a difference in the election outcome. Turnout is considerably higher, especially in presidential elections, in battleground or swing states. (These states are sometimes referred to as “purple” states—as opposed to “red” states—solidly Republican or “blue” states—solidly Democratic.) Voters in these states are much more likely to have visits from the candidates or their surrogates and be subjected to a lot more direct appeals for their votes via television ads. In the 2012 presidential election, 96 percent of the spending on television ads between April and Election Day by presidential campaigns and allied groups was in the 10 battleground states. Likewise, 99 percent of the campaign stops by the presidential or vice presidential candidates were in the battleground states.¹¹ Voter turnout rates were considerably higher in the highly competitive swing states.

In state and local elections, especially legislative contests, turnout tends to be considerably higher when districts are more evenly balanced between Democrats and Republicans and lower in safe, or one-party dominated, districts. Redistricting efforts completed after every Census are either done by legislators or independent redistricting commissions.

Election 2000 also reopened other debates about the impact of media coverage on voter turnout in different time zones.¹² The network practice of using exit polls to “call” elections before the polls have closed everywhere has long been under attack, especially by political parties and candidates on the West Coast. The National Commission on Federal Election Reform recommended this practice be stopped, at least in the 48 contiguous states. Although the national television networks have become more cautious and no longer “officially” call a state until all its polls are closed (important in states with multiple time zones), they still refuse to wait until all polls in every state are closed to report projections based on pre-election polls. Newsgathering is a highly competitive business—being first is a high priority. Yet a network “calling” a presidential race over before the polls have closed is seen by candidates for state and local offices that day as unfairly tamping down turnout in their races.

There are two steps involved in the election process: registration and voting. States differ considerably in how they structure each step in the process. It is not surprising, then, that some turnout rate differentials are attributed to statutory (legal) differences across the states.

Controversies over voter eligibility and what is required to prove it have escalated in recent years. Most states accept the federal government’s proof of citizenship (a requisite for registering to vote), which requires registrants to sign a statement swearing that they are a citizen under penalty of perjury. Some states, most notably Arizona, have argued they have the right to require physical evidence such as a birth certificate, naturalization papers, or a U.S. passport to prove citizenship. Arizona’s more rigorous approach was challenged and reached the U.S. Supreme Court in 2013. The Court ruled it unconstitutional (Arizona v. Inter-Tribal Council of Arizona), and said that Arizona’s requirement that a registrant provide actual proof of U.S. citizenship is preempted by the National Voter Registration Act’s mandate that states “accept and use” the federal form. States also differ in requirements for reinstating the voting rights of convicted felons. In 15 states, it is automatic immediately upon release from prison; in others, it may require a formal request, a waiting period, restitution of damages, or approval by a state board. It may even depend on the nature of the crime.²⁷

Another area of controversy is voter list maintenance—the updating of voter registration lists by local election officials. State procedures for removing (purging) deceased voters, convicted criminals (felons), or inactive voters from voter registration rolls differ. Use of national databases to remove noncitizens from the rolls has been particularly controversial in some border states, as has the motive for and timing of voter purges.

Over half the states have some form of voter ID requirement. Of those that do, there is a lot of variation. (See Figure 4-3.) According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, the two key distinctions are whether a law is strict or not, and whether or not the ID must include a photo.²⁸

• Strict versus Nonstrict: In the “strict” states, a voter cannot cast a valid ballot without first presenting ID. Voters who are unable to show ID at the polls are given a provisional ballot. Those provisional ballots are kept separate from the regular ballots. If the voter returns to election officials within a short period of time after the election (generally a few days) and presents acceptable ID, the provisional ballot is counted. If the voter does not come back to show ID, that provisional ballot is never counted.

• Photo versus Nonphoto: Some states require that the ID presented at the polls must show a photo of the voter. Some of these are “strict” voter ID laws, in that voters who fail to show photo ID are given a provisional ballot and must eventually show photo ID in order to get that provisional ballot counted. Others are “nonstrict,” and voters without ID have other options for casting a regular ballot. They may be permitted to sign an affidavit of identity, or poll workers may be able to vouch for them if they know them personally. In these “nonstrict” states, voters who fail to bring ID on Election Day aren’t required to return to election officials and show ID in order to have their ballot counted. In the other voter ID states, there is a wide array of IDs that are acceptable for voting purposes, some of which do not include a photo of the voter. Again, some of these states are “strict” in the sense that a voter who fails to bring ID on Election Day will be required to vote a provisional ballot, and that provisional ballot will be counted only if the voter returns to election officials within a few days to show acceptable ID.

Voter IDs have become a lightning rod for partisan battles. The charge against them has been led by voter protection groups, mostly liberal and Democratic-leaning, who firmly believe that such laws reduce registration and turnout rates among young and minority voters.²⁹ However, legislators in states adopting tougher ID laws defend them on the grounds that they prevent fraud and thereby protect the integrity of the vote. They often cite public opinion polls that have consistently shown that a majority of Americans favor voter ID laws.

The nation’s aging electorate—and the growing number of voters with sight, hearing, and/or mobility limitations—has also prompted states to reexamine the location of their polling places, along with the accessibility of their voting booths, ballot design, and voting technology, and to place more emphasis on training poll workers. So, too, has the federal Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act (VAEHA), enacted in 1984. Under the Act, states are responsible for ensuring that polling places for federal elections are accessible to elderly voters and voters with disabilities.

At the same time, it is becoming more difficult to secure polling locations using traditional venues like churches, schools, nonprofit headquarters, and small businesses due to their structural inadequacies and liability concerns. For example, many schools have become “off-limits” as polling stations due to concerns about child security. Fewer polling locations can cause longer lines on Election Day. Long lines in key battleground states like Florida were such a high-profile problem in 2012 that President Obama created the Presidential Commission on Election Administration, even though nationally the average Election Day wait time in 2012 (13 minutes) was shorter than in 2008 (14 minutes) and wait times were actually longer during early voting (20 minutes) than on Election Day (13 minutes).³⁰ The new commission was charged with making recommendations on how to more efficiently run elections “in order to ensure that all eligible voters have the opportunity to cast their ballots without undue delay, and to improve the experiences of voters facing other obstacles in casting their ballots, such as members of the military, overseas voters, voters with disabilities, and voters with limited English proficiency.”

One solution to the long-line problem may be to rely more on larger public facilities (community centers, libraries) than on smaller neighborhood-level locations. However, this more central vote center approach can prompt a political backlash from citizens used to having a close-by polling location. Closing of polling places in minority or poor neighborhoods can also yield claims of discrimination. Long lines might also be alleviated by more voting machines (but they cost $3,000 to $6,000 per machine), more and better trained poll workers, shorter and better designed ballots reducing the time voters spend in the booth, and, of course, early voting, if there are enough locations.³¹

Another factor affecting the ease of voting (and confidence in the results) is the type of voting equipment available. The vast majority of Americans cast their ballots on two primary types of voting equipment: paper ballots with optical scan (56%) and electronic voting machines called DREs—direct recording electronic machines (39%).³² DRE systems have been under attack almost from their inception for their unreliability, vulnerability to tampering, and lack of a paper trail in the event of a needed recount. Consequently, many states have abandoned them in favor of optical scan paper-based systems similar to standardized test scantrons. But DREs are viewed more favorably by some disabled voters who worry a paper trail will jeopardize their right to a secret ballot. The Director of the Disability Vote Project of the American Association of People with Disabilities has testified that electronic touch-screen machines are the only “certified, tested, and proven equipment” that provide full access to disabled voters and provide a secret ballot.³³

The growing number of Americans connected to the Internet raises the question of whether voting online would promote democracy or permit fraud. Some analysts believe it would substantially increase voter turnout because of its convenience. They argue it would give voters more time to think about how to vote on complex ballot initiatives and confusing bond referenda. Others are more skeptical. They worry about how to verify a voter’s eligibility and identification and how to prevent hackers from “stealing” an election. Another concern is the “digital divide” that still exists between rich and poor in America and between men and women,³⁴ although the gap continues to narrow.

Online-based voting-related procedures are becoming more widespread reflecting the technological revolution that has many Americans “wired in” to the Web. A number of states now allow persons to register online, change addresses, and to request absentee ballots. Online registration has been particularly effective in increasing registration among younger voters and online requests for absentee ballots have increased among military and overseas personnel, rising from 22 percent in 2010 to 52 percent in 2012.³⁵ But the fear remains that any Web-based activity or resulting database can easily be hacked. Florida was the first state to experience cyberattacks against a U.S. elections system when, in 2012, hackers illegally requested more than 2,500 absentee ballots from registered voters in Miami-Dade County who had not asked for them.³⁶ The hackers were never identified.

Interest in actually voting via the Internet has increased largely in the context of making it possible for military service and overseas personnel to cast a ballot in a timely fashion to ensure it will be counted. The process has yet to be refined. A big concern is that those choosing to vote online will be giving up the secrecy of their ballot. Some caution that “the secrecy of the ballot is no small thing to give up—it is how we protect voters from coercion and prevent voters from selling their votes.”³⁷ Safeguards against this have yet to be developed.

For years, black voter turnout rates lagged behind white turnout, primarily due to discrimination. (More is said about this later in the chapter.) But this gap has closed in recent years. Now, black voter turnout often exceeds white turnout, especially in areas where blacks make up a sizable portion of the voting age population, when a minority person is a candidate in a high-profile election or the first minority to run for the office, and in places where black churches are proactive in voter mobilization and education.³⁸

In the 2012 presidential election, black voter turnout surpassed white voter turnout for the first time in U.S. history. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, 66.2 percent of eligible black voters cast ballots in 2012, up from 64.7 percent in 2008. In contrast, non-Hispanic white turnout in 2012 was 64.1 percent, which fell from 66.1 percent four years earlier. As recently as 1996, blacks had turnout rates 8 percentage points lower than non-Hispanic whites.

Voter participation rates among Hispanics still trail black and white turnout. However, when allowances are made for education, income, age, and mobility, this turnout gap almost disappears.³⁹ Nonetheless, Hispanic voter participation overall is on the upswing and gap between Hispanics and African Americans is gradually narrowing. In the 2012 presidential election, Hispanics cast 10 percent of the total vote (up 1% from 2008), compared to African Americans who cast 13 percent—the same as in 2012. Hispanics, like blacks, are more likely to vote for Latinos—a practice known as “co-ethnic voting.”⁴⁰

Various explanations have been advanced for the lower voter participation of Hispanics. For starters, language can be a steep hurdle to jump, especially for newly arrived immigrants. The good news is that the emergence of Spanish-speaking television, radio, and newspapers is helping candidates reach out to this population more easily than in the past.⁴¹ So, too, is the availability of ballots in Spanish. Hispanic voter turnout is also affected by one’s country of origin. There is less interest among immigrants from certain Central and South American countries where politics is largely reserved for elites and for men (patriarchal societies). It is no surprise that naturalized Hispanic citizens, with the exception of Cuban Americans, still vote at lower rates than their American-born peers. But this is changing rapidly as the Hispanic population continues to explode in the United States.⁴²

As Hispanics emerge as the nation’s largest minority, both Democratic and Republican parties vie for their votes. To remain competitive, Republicans must win a substantial portion of Hispanic voters, inasmuch as African American voters are solidly Democratic. In the 2012 presidential election, 93 percent of the African American vote was cast for Democratic candidate Barack Obama. (See Table 4-2.) The Latino vote in 2012 split 71 percent for Democrat Obama to 27 percent for Republican Mitt Romney (a loss of 4% for the Republicans over 2008). Eight years earlier, the Republican Bush brothers (President George W. Bush and Florida Governor Jeb Bush) made special efforts to recruit Hispanic voters to their party. Both speak Spanish (Jeb better than George W.). Both brothers had attempted to deal with Hispanic concerns as governors of their states, Texas and Florida, and both succeeded in winning over substantial portions of the Hispanic voters in those states. But by the 2008 election, Democrats had successfully recaptured some of the Hispanic vote and continued their dominance into 2012. Many Republicans, including a number of Republican state governors, are fearful it will be difficult to win back the Hispanic support they once had in light of their party’s tough stances on immigration.

Asian Americans are the highest-income, best-educated and fastest-growing racial group in the United States, even though they make up only a small proportion of the total U.S. population (nearly 6%). Historically, Asian voter turnout rates have lagged behind those of whites, blacks, and Hispanics.⁴³ Some attribute their higher levels of nonvoting to

2004	White	African American	Latino	Asian
Note: represents an insufficient number of respondents. Source: Data from Voter News Service exit poll, November 2008; National Election Poll (or NEP) Exit Poll, conducted by Edison/Mitofsky, November 2008 (available at http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/results/polls/#val=USP00p1); 2012 data from 2012 CNN Exit Poll, November 2012. Available at http://www.cnn.com/election/2012/results/race/president.
Share % of Total 2004 Vote	77	11	8	2
Republican Bush	58	11	44	44
Democrat Kerry	41	88	53	56
Independent Nader	0	0	2
2008	White	African American	Latino	Asian
Share % of Total 2008 Vote	74	13	9	2
Republican McCain	55	4	31	35
Democrat Obama	43	95	67	62
Other	2	1	2	3
2012	White	African American	Latino	Asian
Share % of Total 2012 Vote	72	13	10	3
Republican Romney	59	6	27	26
Democrat Obama	39	93	71	73
Other	2	1	2	1

more pervasive language and cultural barriers. Others point to the higher-than-average tendency of newly registered Asians to register as independents, rather than Democrats or Republicans.⁴⁴ (As noted previously, partisans are higher turnout voters than independents.) While Asian Americans are still more prone to be independents compared with other racial and ethnic groups, they have become more Democratic in their political party preferences and presidential voting patterns over the past decade. In the 2012 presidential election, the vast majority of Asian Americans (73%) voted for President Obama—higher even than among Hispanics. (See Table 4-2.) There are, however, some partisan differences among the Asian subgroups. The highest support for Democrats is among Indian Americans and Japanese Americans. For Republicans, it is among U.S. Vietnamese and Filipinos.⁴⁵

Early in American history, voting was limited to males over 21 years of age, who resided in the voting district for a certain period and owned a considerable amount of land or received a large income from other investments. So great was the fear that the “common man” would use his vote to attack the rights of property that only 120,000 people out of 2 million were permitted to vote in the 1780s. Men of property felt that only other men of property had a sufficient “stake in society” to exercise their vote in a “responsible” fashion. Gradually, however, Jeffersonian and Jacksonian principles of democracy, including confidence in the reason and integrity of the common man, spread rapidly in the new republic. Most property qualifications were eliminated by the states in the early nineteenth century.

The first constitutional limitation on state powers over voting came with the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment: “The right of the citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any state on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” The object of this amendment, passed by the Reconstruction Congress and adopted in 1870, was to extend the vote to former black slaves and prohibit voter discrimination on the basis of race. The Fifteenth Amendment also gives Congress the power to enforce black voting rights “by appropriate legislation.” Thus, the states retained their right to determine voter qualifications as long as they do not practice racial discrimination, and Congress was given the power to pass legislation ensuring black voting rights.

Following the Civil War many of the women who had been active abolitionists, seeking to end slavery, turned their attention to the condition of women in America. They had learned to organize, conduct petition campaigns, and parade and demonstrate, as abolitionists, and later they sought to improve the legal and political rights of women. In 1869 the Wyoming territory adopted woman’s suffrage; later several other western states followed suit. But it was not until the Nineteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in 1920 that women’s voting rights were constitutionally guaranteed.

For almost 100 years after the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment, white politicians in the southern states were able to defeat its purposes. Social and economic pressures and threats of violence were used to intimidate many thousands of would-be African American voters. There were also many “legal” methods of disenfranchisement.

For many years the most effective means of banning black voting was a technique known as the “white primary .” So strong was the Democratic Party throughout the South that the Democratic nomination for public office was tantamount to election. This meant that primary elections to choose the Democratic nominee were the only elections in which real choices were made. If blacks were prevented from voting in Democratic primaries, they could be effectively disenfranchised. Thus southern state legislatures resorted to the simple device of declaring the Democratic Party in southern states a private club and ruling that only white people could participate in its elections, that is, in primary elections. Blacks would be free to vote in “official,” general elections, but all whites tacitly agreed to support the Democratic, or “white man’s,” party, in general elections, regardless of their differences in the primary. Not until 1944, in Smith v. Allwright, did the U.S. Supreme Court declare this practice unconstitutional.⁴⁶

Black voting in the South increased substantially after World War II. (From an estimated 5% of voting age blacks registered in southern states in the 1940s, black registration rose to an estimated 20% in 1952, 25% in 1956, 28% in 1960, and 39% in 1964.) But as late as 1965 the black voter turnout rate was little more than half of the white rate. In hundreds of rural counties throughout the South, blacks were prevented from registering and voting. Despite the Fifteenth Amendment, many local registrars in the South succeeded in barring black registration by means of an endless variety of obstacles, delays, and frustrations. Application forms for registration were lengthy and complicated; even a minor error would lead to rejection, such as underlining rather than circling in the “Mr.–Mrs.–Miss” set of choices. Literacy tests were the most common form of disenfranchisement. Many a black college graduate failed to interpret “properly” the complex legal documents that were part of the test. White applicants for voter registration were seldom asked to go through these lengthy procedures.

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 made it unlawful for registrars to apply unequal standards in registration procedures or to reject applications because of immaterial errors. It required that literacy tests be in writing and made a sixth-grade education a presumption of literacy.

The Twenty-fourth Amendment to the Constitution was ratified in 1964, making poll taxes unconstitutional as a requirement for voting in national elections. In 1965 the U.S. Supreme Court declared poll taxes unconstitutional in state and local elections as well.⁴⁷

In Selma, Alabama, in early 1965, civil rights organizations effectively demonstrated that local registrars were still keeping large numbers of blacks off the voting rolls. Registrars closed their offices for all but a few hours every month, placed limits on the number of applications processed, went out to lunch when black applicants appeared, delayed months before processing applications from blacks, and used a variety of other methods to keep blacks disenfranchised. In response to the Selma-to-Montgomery March, Congress enacted a strong Voting Rights Act in 1965. The U.S. attorney general, upon evidence of voter discrimination, was empowered to replace local registrars with federal registrars, abolish literacy tests, and register voters under simplified federal procedures.⁴⁸ However, it turned out that federal registrars were sent to only a small number of southern counties. Many southern counties that had previously discriminated in voter registration hurried to sign up black voters just to avoid the imposition of federal registrars. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 has been extended and amended several times: 1970, 1975, 1982, and 2006. (The “Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006” extends the Act for 25 more years, until 2031.) Hispanics and other language minorities were added to the Act’s coverage in the 1975 revisions. The impact of the Act has been to largely eliminate discrimination in registration and voting. It has also increased the opportunity of black and Latino voters to elect representatives of their choice by providing a vehicle for challenging discriminatory election methods that may dilute minority-voting strength. The Act has been called “the single most effective piece of civil rights legislation ever passed by Congress.”⁴⁹

One component of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 had been rather controversial for a number of years—the preclearance requirement. The Act imposed a preclearance requirement on certain states and counties, mostly in the South, that met a coverage formula standard. The preclearance required state and local governments that were attempting to change registration or voting requirements in any way to submit these changes to the U.S. Department of Justice for its prior approval. The coverage formula was based on decades old voting turnout figures (voter turnout less than 50% in the 1964 presidential election) and voting procedures that had long been discarded by the states. In one of the U.S. Supreme Court’s most controversial rulings (Shelby County v. Holder, 2013), the Court struck down the “coverage formula” in the preclearance requirement of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The Court observed that the coverage formula was out of date: “Nearly 50 years later, things have changed dramatically.” The Court upheld all other sections of the Voting Rights Act, and invited the Congress to draft another formula based on current conditions.

Before 1970 only 3 of the 50 states permitted residents 18 to 21 years of age to vote—Georgia, Kentucky, and Alaska. All other states, in the exercise of their constitutional responsibility to determine the qualifications of “electors,” had set the voting age at 21. The movement for 18-year-old voting received its original impetus in Georgia in 1944 under the leadership of Governor Ellis Arnall, who argued successfully that 18-year-olds were then being called upon to fight and die for their country in World War II and, therefore, deserved to have a voice in the conduct of government. However, this argument failed to convince adult voters in other states; qualifications for military service were not regarded as the same as qualifications for rational decision-making in elections. In state after state, voters rejected state constitutional amendments designed to extend the vote to 18-year-olds.

Congress intervened on behalf of 18-year-old voting with the passage of the Twenty-sixth Amendment to the Constitution in 1971.⁵⁰ The states quickly ratified this amendment, during a period of national turbulence over the Vietnam War. Many supporters of the amendment believed that protests on the campuses and streets could be reduced if youthful protesters were given the vote. Moreover, Democrats believed that their party would gain from the youth vote, and liberal candidates believed that idealistic young voters would spark their campaigns.

It turned out, however, that young people cast their votes for parties and candidates in the same proportions as older voters. The image of the idealistic, activist student was not an accurate image of the young voter in America at that time. However, all that has changed in the twenty-first century. Today’s youngest generation, the Millennials, is by far more liberal than older generations. Some scholars have even labeled them the most solidly Democratic-voting age bloc. What is still true is that college students are more likely to be activists and to vote than their non-college-educated counterparts. In 2012, the voter turnout rate of young people was 63 percent compared to just 36 percent among young non-college-educated persons.⁵¹ It is not surprising, then, that candidates focus more of their attention on college students and college campuses at election time.

Congress strengthened the Voting Rights Act in 1982 by outlawing any electoral arrangements that had the effect of weakening minority voting power. This “effects” test replaced the earlier “intent” test, which required black plaintiffs to prove that a particular arrangement was adopted with the specific intent of reducing black voting power.⁵² (An “intent” test invalidates laws or practices only if they are designed to discriminate; an “effects” test invalidates laws or practices that adversely affect racial minorities regardless of the original intent.) For example, at-large elections or multimember districts for city councils, county commissions, or state legislative seats may have the effect of weakening minority voting power if a white majority in such districts consistently prevents blacks or Hispanics from winning office. Congress stopped short of directly outlawing such districts but established a “totality of circumstances” test to be used to determine if such districts had a discriminatory effect. The “circumstances” to be considered by the courts include whether or not there has been a history of racial polarization in voting and whether minority candidates have ever won election to office in the district.⁵³

The U.S. Supreme Court requires states and cities to provide minorities with a “realistic opportunity to elect officials of their choice.” In the key case of Thornburg v. Gingles, ⁵⁴ the Court interpreted the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982 to require state legislatures to draw election district boundary lines in a way that guarantees that minorities can elect minority representatives to governing bodies. The burden of proof was shifted from minorities to show that district lines diluted their voting strength to state lawmakers to show that they have done everything possible to maximize minority representation. The effect of the Court’s decision was to inspire affirmative racial gerrymandering—the creation of predominantly black and minority districts wherever possible. (Gerrymandering is drawing a district to give an advantage to a political party, candidate, or racial/ethnic or language minority group.)

Racial gerrymandering dominated the redistricting process in all of the large states following the 1990 Census. In many states Republican legislators allied themselves with black and Hispanic groups in efforts to create minority districts; Republicans understood that “packing” minority (usually Democratic) voters into selected districts would reduce Democratic votes in many other districts.⁵⁵ The U.S. Justice Department also pressed state legislatures to maximize the number of “majority-minority” congressional and state legislative districts. With the assistance of sophisticated computer models, state legislatures and federal courts drew many odd-shaped minority congressional and state legislative districts.

Yet the U.S. Supreme Court has expressed constitutional doubts about bizarre-shaped districts based solely on racial composition. In a controversial 5–4 decision, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote: “Race gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us into competing racial factions... A reapportionment plan that includes in one district individuals who have little in common with one another but the color of their skin bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid.”⁵⁶ (See Figure 4-4.) Later the Court held that the use of race as the “predominant factor” in dividing district lines is unconstitutional: “When the state assigns voters on the basis of race, it engages in the offensive and demeaning assumption that voters of a particular race, because of their race, think alike, share the same political interests and will prefer the same candidates at the polls.”⁵⁷ But the Court stopped short of saying that all race-conscious districting is unconstitutional. Several states redrew the boundaries of majority-minority districts trying to conform to the Court’s opinions.

More recently the battles have been over how to define a “majority” minority district. Should it simply be a district in which a minority group makes up a numerical majority of the voting age population? Or should it be a district in which more than one minority group works together to form a majority (a coalition district)? Or in instances where a numerical majority-minority district cannot be drawn, should states create influence districts in which the minority can influence the outcome of an election even if its preferred candidate cannot be elected? Or should crossover districts be drawn in which a minority can persuade enough nonminority voters to cross over to and vote for the minority’s preferred candidate? In Bartlett v. Strickland (2009), the U.S. Supreme Court was asked to rule on whether the state of North Carolina could be required to draw a crossover district under Section 2 of the federal Voting Rights Act. In a 5–4 decision, it ruled that to comply with Section 2, the legislature would have to draw a numerical majority district, not an influence, crossover, or coalition district. It did not prohibit the state from doing so,

but merely ruled it was not required to do so under the Act. The constitutional status of affirmative racial gerrymandering remains unclear.

Black representation in state and local governments, as well as in the U.S. Congress, rose dramatically in the 1990s. The total number of blacks elected to state and local office rose rapidly after 1980. New minority districts in many states boosted black representation in state legislatures. Today, roughly 9 percent of all 7,382 state legislators in the nation are African Americans. There are almost 1,000 black elected officials at the county level, over 4,000 at the municipal level, and nearly 20,000 black school board members across the country. The South has the largest number of black elected officials, while the small far western states have the fewest. We return to the question of minority representation in state legislatures in Chapter 6 and on city councils in Chapter 11.

Increases in the number of African American officeholders in state and local government are primarily the result of the creation of more black majority districts in cities and states. Few blacks win office in majority white city council, county commission, school board, or state legislative districts, although the number is increasing over time. In legislative districts where the black population is 65 percent or more, black candidates win 98 percent of the legislative seats. Majority white districts elect black candidates to about 2 percent of their legislative seats. While a few notable black political leaders have won electoral support across racial lines, racial polarization in voting remains a fact of life in many communities.⁵⁸

The progress of Hispanics in state and local politics in recent years is reflected in the election of several governors and increasing numbers of state legislators, city and county commission members, and school board members. However, Hispanic political influence in the states is still limited. Latinos make up 3 percent of all state legislators. Latinos have been more successful at capturing school board seats—almost 1,900—and municipal offices—over 1,600. More than 500 have also been elected to county posts. Hispanic voter turnout is much lower than that for other ethnic groups in America. Many Hispanics are resident aliens and therefore are not eligible to vote. Language barriers may also present an obstacle to full participation. Finally, Hispanic voters divide their political loyalties. Cuban Americans tend to vote Republican. They are economically successful, they are concentrated in the Miami area, and they are a major force in city and state politics in Florida. The largest Hispanic group, Mexican Americans, tends to vote Democratic; their power is concentrated in California, Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico.⁵⁹ Puerto Ricans, the second largest Hispanic subgroup, is largely concentrated in New York, Florida, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. They also tend to vote Democratic, although some research has found that Puerto Ricans coming straight from the island tend to have weaker attachments to either political party because of their lack of familiarity with the U.S. party system. Campaigns designed to reach them focus more on events that permit personal interactions with the candidate or surrogates who speak Spanish well.

Women have made impressive political gains in state politics in recent years. Almost one-fourth of the nation’s 7,383 state legislators are women. Women hold 21 percent of the 1,972 state senate seats and 25 percent of the 5,411 state house or assembly seats. Thirty-five women have served as governors of 26 states.⁶⁰ Seventy-five of the 320 statewide executive offices across the country (about 23%) are held by women—38 are Democrats and 37 are Republicans. In the 113th Congress—2013–2014—women make up 18 percent of all Congress members (see Table 4-3); 77 women serve in the U.S. House and 20 in the U.S. Senate. While these figures are modest, they represent significant advances over the recent past. In 1969 only 4 percent of the nation’s state legislators were women.

Until the election of Ella Grasso (D–Connecticut) and Dixy Lee Ray (D–Washington) in the late 1970s, no woman had won election to the governor’s office on her own; earlier women governors had succeeded their husbands to that office. Women are making even more rapid gains in city and county offices. The total number of women officeholders in local government has more than tripled over the past decade. As of January 2012, of the 1,248 mayors of U.S. cities with populations over 30,000, 217, or 17 percent, were women.⁶¹ This influx of

women at the grassroots level is now contributing to the success of women in running for and winning higher state and national offices, although some women from the corporate world are choosing to bypass local politics and make statewide or congressional races their first run for office.

Women continue to confront special challenges when running for office.⁶² In some places, political party leaders still tend to assist male more than female candidates.⁶³ In general, female candidates enjoy a slight advantage over male candidates in public perceptions of honesty, sincerity, and caring. However, women candidates are often perceived as “not tough enough” to deal with hard issues such as drugs and crime. When women candidates seek to prove that they are “tough,” they risk being branded with adjectives like “strident” or “abrasive.”

The gender gap in politics refers to differences between women and men in political views, party affiliation, and voting choices. This gap has narrowed slightly in recent years, with women currently more likely to identify with the Democratic Party and men as Republicans. Indeed, at the presidential level, national polls indicate that the majority of men voted for Republicans George H.W. Bush in 1992, Bob Dole in 1996, and George W. Bush in 2000 and 2004, and that a majority of women favored Bill Clinton in 1992 and 1996, Al Gore in 2000, John Kerry in 2004, and Barack Obama in 2008 and 2012. This gender gap extends into state politics as well, with women frequently giving Democratic gubernatorial candidates 5 to 10 more percentage points than men, although the gap varies across states.

Do greater numbers of women in state and local elected offices make any significant difference in public policy? Political scientists have attempted to answer this question but have had only mixed results. Male legislators support feminist positions on ERA, abortion, employment, education, and health just as often as female legislators. However, there is some evidence that women legislators give higher priority to these issues. Women are more likely than men to have as their “top legislative priority” bills focusing on women’s and children’s issues. However, state legislatures with larger percentages of women do not pass feminist legislation any more often than state legislatures with fewer women legislators.⁶⁴ (Women’s priority issues are discussed in Chapter 15.)

There may also be gender-based attitudinal differences that affect a wide range of policy issues. For example, women state legislators may be more likely to view social problems such as crime in a larger societal context, leading them to focus on preventive and interventionist policies. Male legislators may view crime as an individual act that can be curtailed by certain swift and severe punishment. Over time as women increase their numbers in state legislatures and city councils, we might expect subtle changes in both the style and substance of policymaking.⁶⁵

In 2012, young voters made up a larger proportion of the electorate than seniors 65 and older (19% of voters were 18 to 29 years of age while just 16% were age 65 and older). They were also more cohesive in their voting patterns and in some key battleground states (Ohio, Florida, Virginia, and Pennsylvania), they were the key to President Obama winning the state and the election. But senior citizens often hold the upper hand in determining the outcome of state and local elections held in nonpresidential election years because their turnout rates are considerably higher than that of the Millennials.⁶⁹ In some states, the voting power of senior citizens in these elections may even be twice that of younger voters in state and local elections held in nonpresidential election years when young voter turnout plummets. It is important to note that the senior vote is gradually becoming less Democratic.⁷⁰ The passing of the once most solidly Democratic voting generation (the FDR-era seniors) and its replacement by the somewhat more conservative Baby Boomer generation has made the senior vote less cohesive and more Republican leaning. Today, it is the youngest generation that is the most solidly Democratic in its voting patterns, even though a sizable proportion describes themselves as independents.

There is actually a great deal of misunderstanding about the priorities of the different generations and a lot of mislabeling, such as “greedy geezers,” “selfish GenXers,” or “Me-Millennials.” (GenXers were born 1965–1981; Millennials were born 1982–2000.) In reality, on many state and local issues, the young and the old often agree on what are the big problems. Where they differ is on which problem should be tackled first. Surveys have shown that the priorities of different age cohorts often vary:

On economics:

• Young: economy and jobs

• Old: taxes and government spending

On noneconomic domestic issues:

• Young: education, environment, crime, moral issues (liberal)

• Old: health, social services, crime, moral issues (conservative)

These same surveys have shown that the generations also differ on the causes and cures of problems:

• Young: identify economic causes; favor solutions with a preventive emphasis; look more to government for solutions.

• Old: point to lapses in individual responsibility as major cause; favor reactive approaches; are more likely to believe the private sector, nongovernmental entities, and individuals produce better solutions to societal problems than government.

Groups may be highly organized into formal organizations with offices and professional staffs within the capitals of every state: The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, the AFL-CIO, and the National Education Association are examples of highly organized interest groups that operate in every state. Other groups have little formal organization and appear at state capitals only when an issue of particular concern arises, for example, when motorcyclists assemble to protest mandatory helmets, or when commercial fishermen come to complain about banning of nets.

Interest groups may be organized around occupational or economic interests (e.g., the Association of Real Estate Boards, the Association of Broadcasters, the Bankers Association, the Automobile Dealers Association, the Cattleman’s Association, the Home Builders Association, the Insurance Council, the Association of Trial

Lawyers), or on racial or religious bases (e.g., the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the Christian Coalition, the National Council of Churches, the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith), or around shared experiences (e.g., the American Legion, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the League of Women Voters, the Automobile Association of America), or around ideological positions (e.g., Americans for Democratic Action, Common Cause, Americans for Constitutional Action). Labor unions, especially those representing employees of governments and school districts (e.g., the National Education Association, the American Federation of Teachers, the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees), as well as industrial unions and the state AFL-CIO federation, are well organized and well represented in virtually all state capitals.⁷¹ Government officials and governments themselves organize and help exert pressure on higher levels of government (e.g., the National Governors’ Conference, the Council of State Governments, the National League of Cities, U.S. Conference of Mayors, the National Association of Chiefs of Police, the National Association of Counties). Even the recipients of government services have organized themselves (e.g., the Michigan Welfare Rights Organization).

Overall, economic interests are more frequently encountered in state politics than noneconomic interests. But certainly the proliferation of active noneconomic groups in America, from the environmentalists’ Sierra Club to the senior citizens’ AARP and the liberal-oriented Common Cause, testifies to the importance of organization in all phases of political life. Particularly active at the state level are the businesses subject to extensive regulation by state governments. Banks, truckers, doctors and lawyers, insurance companies, the gaming industry, utilities, hospitals, and liquor interests are consistently found to be among the most highly organized groups in state capitals. Chapters of the National Education Association are also highly active in state capitals, presenting the demands of educational administrators and teachers. And local governments and local government officials are well organized to present their demands.

A national survey of interest group activity in all 50 state capitals identified groups that were rated “most effective” in the states (see Table 4-4).

Often groups and corporations choose to be “represented” in state capitals by professional lobbyists. Many successful professional lobbyists are former legislators (see Chapter 6), former executive officials, or former top gubernatorial or legislative aides who have turned their state government experience into a career. They “know their way around” the capital. They offer their services—access to legislative and executive officials, knowledge of the lawmaking process, ability to present information and testimony to key policymakers at the right time, political skills and knowledge, personal friendships, and “connections”—to their clients at rates that usually depend on their reputation for influence. Occasionally their compensation is tied to their success in getting a bill passed; a six-figure fee may rest on the outcome of a single vote. Some professional lobbyists are attached to law firms or public relations firms and occasionally do other work; others are full-time lobbyists with multiple clients.

Most professional lobbyists publicly attribute their success to hard work, persistence, information, and ability to get along with others. They cite such qualities as “Being prepared, personal credibility”; “Legislators know I’m going to present the facts whether they’re favorable to my client or not”; “I’m a forceful advocate—determined”; “Doing my homework on the issues”; “Knowledge of the issues I’m dealing with and knowledge of the system”; “I try to understand the political pressures on elected officials.” Yet in more candid moments professional lobbyists will acknowledge that their success is largely attributable to personal friendships, political experience, and financial contributions: “Close friends I made in the legislature while I served as Speaker of the House”; “I raise a lot of money for people”; “My client has the largest political action committee in the state.”⁷²

It is difficult to get a comprehensive picture of interest group activity in state capitals. Many organizations, businesses, legal firms, and individuals engage in interest group activity of one kind or another, and it is hard to keep track of their varied activities. Most states require the registration of “lobbyists” and the submission of reports about their membership and finances. (See Rankings of the States: Registered Lobbyists.) These laws do not restrain lobbying (that would probably violate the First Amendment freedom to “petition” the government for “redress of grievances”). Rather, they are meant to spotlight the activities of lobbyists. However, many hundreds of lobbyists never register under the pretext that they are not really lobbyists, but, instead, businesses, public relations firms, lawyers, researchers, or educational people. Usually, only the larger, formal, organized interest groups and professional lobbyists are officially registered as lobbyists in their states. While some states are more rigorously monitoring the registration and reporting of lobbyists, often it is the news media that are the most intense “lobbyist watchdogs.” On the other hand, statehouse reporters are the first to admit they rank lobbyists as great sources of information about what is going on in the legislature.⁷³

Typical lists of lobbying activities as supplied by lobbyists themselves usually begin with testifying at legislative committee hearings, contacting legislators directly, and helping to draft legislation. These lists usually go on to include getting constituents to contact legislators, inspiring letter-writing campaigns, and entering coalitions with other groups to lobby about particular pieces of legislation. Somewhat fewer lobbyists admit to making monetary contributions to legislators and performing personal and political favors for them, but we know from campaign contribution records and anecdotal evidence that these practices are common. Some lobbying organizations focus more on filing lawsuits or otherwise engaging in court litigation; indeed, some larger organizations have semiautonomous “legal defense” branches to carry on such activity. Relatively few interest groups resort to protests and demonstrations. None admit to direct bribery, but, as we shall see, reports of direct payments to legislators or their campaign funds in exchange for votes are not uncommon.

More time is spent by lobbyists on monitoring the content and progress of bills affecting their clients and members than on any other activity. Just “keeping tabs” on what is going on each day in government is a time-consuming task. Lobbyists must be aware of any provisions of any bills affecting their clients, even provisions that are buried in a bill that does not mention them in its title or summary. Typically lobbyists may identify 100 or more bills that might affect their clients or members each legislative session, although they are likely to closely monitor the progress of only 20 or 30 bills that have a chance of becoming enacted.⁷⁴ (Less than 25% of bills introduced in a legislature are ever enacted in any form into law; see Chapter 6 .) Lobbyists must be watchful: Nothing is more embarrassing to a lobbyist than to find that the legislature has passed a bill adversely affecting their client’s interests without their ever knowing about it.

Lobbying is defined as any communication, by someone acting on behalf of a group, directed at a government decision maker with the hope of influencing that person. Direct persuasion is usually more than just a matter of argument or emotional appeal to the lawmaker. Often it involves the communication of useful technical and political information. Many public officials are required to vote on, or decide about, hundreds of questions each year. It is impossible for them to be fully informed about the wide variety of bills and issues they face. Consequently, many decision makers depend on skilled lobbyists to provide technical information about matters requiring action, and to inform them of the policy preferences of important segments of the population. (See “Lobbying in State Legislatures” in Chapter 6.)

The behavior of lobbyists depends on the interests they represent and the characteristics of the state political system in which they function. Some interests hire full-time lobbyists; others rely on attorneys or firms who lobby on behalf of more than one group. This tends to be true in larger, more diverse states with more interest groups needing lobbyists’ help. (See Ranking of the States: Total Number of Lobbyist Clients.) Still other interests rely on volunteers. Some maintain active contact with legislators or make campaign contributions. Some formulate a legislative agenda each session and trace the progress of bills in which they are interested. Indeed, one study of lobbying on behalf of the aging in four separate states revealed much variation in lobbying activity even on the same issues.⁷⁵

Lobbying in state capitals may be somewhat cruder—if not more corrupt—than lobbying in Washington. In interviewing lobbyists and legislators in Washington, Lester Milbrath found that they considered state lobbying much more corrupt than national lobbying. “‘Lobbying is very different before state legislators; it is much more individualistic. Maybe this is the reason they have more bribery in state legislatures than in Congress.’ ‘In the state legislatures, lobbying is definitely on a lower plane. The lobbyists are loose and hand out money and favors quite freely.’ ‘Lobbying at the state level is cruder, more basic, and more obvious.’”⁷⁶ Needless to say, it is difficult to document such statements. However, it seems reasonable to believe that state legislators might be more subject to the appeals of organized interest groups than members of Congress.

State legislators, unlike most members of Congress, are only part-time lawmakers. They must manage their own business, professional, and investment interests in addition to their legislative duties. They may have personal business or professional or real estate or legal ties with the same interests that are seeking to influence their legislative behavior. Such “conflicts of interest”—legislators voting in committee or on the floor on issues in which they have a personal financial interest—are not uncommon. Indeed, some interests occasionally seek to establish business or professional ties with legislators just to win their support.

Bribery is the offering of anything of value to government officials to influence them in the performance of their duties. Vote buying is illegal but not unheard of in state capitals. Instead of bribery, organized interests may contribute to a legislator’s campaign chest without mentioning any specific quid pro quo.

Most people think of interest group tactics as direct attempts to influence decision makers, but many groups spend more of their time, energy, and resources in general public relations activities than anything else. The purpose of a continuing public relations campaign is to create an environment favorable to the interest group and its program. It is hoped that a reservoir of public goodwill can be established, which can be relied on later when a critical issue arises.

Lobbyists know that legislators pay attention to their constituents. Grassroots lobbying involves interest group efforts to get constituents to call or write their legislator on behalf of the group’s position on pending legislation. Grassroots campaigns are now highly professional. They “rely totally on mass marketing, high technology, and public relations ploys reminiscent of political campaigns.”⁷⁷ Form letters supplied by interest groups to constituents to sign and send to their legislator may not be effective. But direct calls, personal letters, e-mails, and faxes, especially from constituents who have previously contributed to a legislator’s campaign, are seldom ignored.

Media campaigns are effective, but also expensive. These involve paid advertisements on radio or television designed to influence public opinion on pending legislation. Heavy media campaigns are more likely to be undertaken by lobbyists in Washington, DC, than in state capitals. Only about 20 to 30 percent of lobbyists in the states report having directly advertised in the media.⁷⁸

Because political campaigns are expensive, it is always difficult for a candidate to find enough money to finance a campaign. This is true for officeholders seeking reelection as well as new contenders. It is perfectly legal for an interest group to make a contribution to a candidate’s campaign fund. Ordinarily, a respectable lobbyist would not be so crude as to exact any specific pledges from a candidate in exchange for a campaign contribution. He or she simply makes a contribution and lets the candidate figure out what to do when in office to ensure further contributions to the candidate’s next campaign. (For further discussion, see “Money in State Politics” in Chapter 5.) There is, however, some evidence that contributions do influence a legislator’s vote if the “vote means the difference between a contributing group’s success or defeat on a bill.”⁷⁹ The organizational strength of a group can also affect public policy. One study of the impact of labor unions on state public policy found that the greater the organizational strength of labor, the more states spend on welfare and education.⁸⁰

Interest groups, operating through political action committees, or PACs, are becoming a major source of campaign funding for state office. As campaign costs increase, reliance on PAC money increases. In large urban states such as California and New York, where campaigns for state legislature may cost $250,000 or more, PAC contributions are the largest source of campaign funding.

PACs are politically sophisticated contributors. They do not like to back losers. Since incumbent members of state legislatures running for reelection seldom lose (see “The Great Incumbency Machine” in Chapter 6), PAC contributions are heavily weighted in favor of incumbents over challengers and candidates from the political party that controls each house of the legislature.

In states where there are campaign contribution limits, interest groups find other ways to support their preferred candidate. They may spend money on an advocacy ad, give an endorsement, or contribute to the state political party of which the candidate is a member.⁸¹

Wealthy urban industrial states (Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island) have weaker interest group systems because of the diversity and complexity of their economies. No single industry can dominate political life. Instead, multiple competing interest groups tend to balance each other, and this cancels the influence of interest groups generally. In contrast, in rural states with less economic diversity, a few dominant industries (oil and gas in Louisiana, coal in West Virginia) appear to have more influence. The reputation for influence for particular industries in these states causes them to be viewed as strong pressure group states.

According to political scientist Sarah McCally Morehouse, “Where parties are strong, pressure groups are weak or moderate; where parties are weak, pressure groups are strong enough to dominate the policy-making process.”⁸³ Where competitive political parties are strong—where the parties actively recruit candidates, provide campaign support, and hold their members accountable after the election—interest groups are less powerful. Policymakers in these states look to the party for policy guidance rather than to interest groups. Interest group influence is channeled through the parties; the parties are coalitions of interest groups; no single interest group can dominate or circumvent the party. Strong party states (Connecticut, New York, Minnesota, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Wisconsin, Massachusetts, Colorado) have weak interest group systems. Weak party states (primarily the one-party southern states) have strong interest group systems.

Strong governors and strong legislative leadership, exercising their influence as party leaders, can provide a check on the lobbying efforts of interest groups. When the special interests lose, it is usually on issues on which the governor and the party leadership have taken a clear stand⁸⁴ or when the governor is of one party and the legislature is controlled by the other (divided control) and the governor vetoes a piece of legislation.

State legislatures are becoming more professional over time. In Chapter 6 we define a professional legislature as a well-paid, full-time, well-staffed body, as opposed to an amateur legislature, which meets only a few weeks each year, pays its members very little, and has few research or information services available to it. Professional legislatures have less turnover in members and more experience in lawmaking. Clearly, these characteristics of legislatures affect the power of interest groups. Interest groups are more influential when legislatures are less professional. When members are less experienced, paid less, and have little time or resources to research issues themselves, they must depend more on interest groups, and interest groups gain influence. Interest groups also frequently have more clout in states with legislative term limits, which have the effect of creating less-experienced lawmakers who turn more to interest groups to help them draft bills and raise campaign funds.⁸⁵

It is also likely that states with weak governors, multiple independently elected state officials, and numerous independent boards and commissions have strong interest group systems. In states with fragmented executive power (Florida, South Carolina), interest groups have additional points of access and control, and executive officials do not have counterbalancing power. Strong governors (as in New York, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Connecticut, Delaware, and Minnesota) are better able to confront the influence of interest groups when they choose to do so. (We discuss governors’ powers in Chapter 7.)

Fortunately, we do not have to choose one explanation to the exclusion of others. Economic diversity, party strength, professionalism, and governmental fragmentation all contribute to the explanation of interest group strength in the states.

“Protest” refers to direct, collective activity by persons who wish to obtain concessions from established power holders. Often the protest is a means of acquiring bargaining power by those who would otherwise be powerless. The protest may challenge established groups by threatening their reputations (in cases in which they might be harmed by unfavorable publicity), their economic position (in cases in which noise and disruption upset their daily activity), or their sense of security (when the threat exists that the protest may turn unruly or violent). The strategy of protest may appeal especially to powerless minorities who have little else to bargain with except the promise to stop protesting.

Protests may also aim at motivating uncommitted “third parties” to enter the political arena on behalf of the protesters. The object of the protest is to call attention to the existence of some issue and urge others to apply pressure on public officials. This strategy requires the support and assistance of the news media. If ignored by television and newspapers, protests can hardly be expected to activate support. However, the news media seldom ignore protests with audience interest; protest leaders and journalists share an interest in dramatizing “news” for the public.

Protests do not necessarily have to take place “in the streets.” The Internet has made it possible for interest groups to protest electronically via highly organized e-mail campaigns to public officials. Some have labeled this new form of protest as “electronic activism.” “You can hear the netroots screaming,” wrote one columnist for the New York Times who was describing an Internet poll being taken by a protest group.⁸⁶

Civil disobedience is a form of protest that involves breaking “unjust” laws. Civil disobedience is not new: It has played an important role in American history, from the Boston Tea Party to the abolitionists who illegally hid runaway slaves, to the suffragettes who demonstrated for women’s voting rights, to the labor organizers who picketed to form the nation’s major industrial unions, to the civil rights workers of the early 1960s who deliberately violated segregation laws. The purpose of civil disobedience is to call attention, or to “bear witness,” to the existence of injustice. In the words of Martin Luther King, Jr., civil disobedience “seeks to dramatize the issue so that it can no longer be ignored.”⁸⁷ True civil disobedience has no violence, and only “unjust” laws are broken. Moreover, the law is broken “openly, lovingly” with a willingness to accept the penalty. Punishment is actively sought rather than avoided, since punishment will help to emphasize the injustice of the law. The object is to stir the conscience of an apathetic majority and win support for measures that will eliminate injustices. By willingly accepting punishment for the violation of an unjust law, people who practice civil disobedience demonstrate their sincerity. They hope to shame public officials and make them ask themselves how far they are willing to go to protect the status quo.

As in all protest activity, the participation of the news media, particularly television, is essential to the success of civil disobedience. The dramatization of injustice makes news; the public’s sympathy is won when injustices are spotlighted; and the willingness of demonstrators to accept punishment is visible evidence of their sincerity. Cruelty or violence directed against demonstrators by police or others plays into the hands of the protesters by further emphasizing injustices.⁸⁸

Violence can also be a form of political participation. To be sure, it is criminal, and it is generally irrational and self-defeating. However, political assassination; bombing and terrorism; and rioting, burning, and looting have occurred with uncomfortable frequency in American politics. Violence is a tool used by groups on both the left and the right ends of the political spectrum. For example, violent protests at the 1999 World Trade Organization meeting in Seattle mostly came from the left, whereas violence against abortion clinics in the 1990s came from the right. The plane crashes into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, were an even more recent reminder that violence is often the primary way extremist groups call attention to their political agendas.

It is important to distinguish violence from protest. Peaceful protest is constitutionally guaranteed. Most protests are free of violence. Occasionally there is an implicit threat of violence in a protest—a threat that can be manipulated by protesters to help gain their ends. However, most protests harness frustrations and hostilities and direct them into constitutionally acceptable activities. Civil disobedience should also be distinguished from violence. The civil disobedient breaks only “unjust” laws, openly and without violence, and willingly accepts punishment without attempting escape. Rioting, burning, and looting—as well as bombing and assassination—are clearly distinguishable from peaceful protest and even civil disobedience.

The real key to success in protest activity is found in the support or opposition of the news media to protest group demands. Virtually all of the studies of protest activity have asserted that it is the response of “third parties,” primarily the news media, and not the immediate response of public officials, that is essential to success.⁸⁹ This is a plausible finding because, after all, if protesters could persuade public officials directly, there would be no need to protest. Indeed, one might even distinguish between “interest groups,” which have a high degree of continuous interaction with public officials, and “protest groups,” which do not regularly interact with public officials and must engage in protest to be heard. Furthermore, to be heard, reports of their protests must be carried in newspapers and on television, which increasingly are reporting protests taking place in the blogosphere.

Several conditions must be present if protest is to be effective.⁹⁰ First of all, there must be a clear goal or objective of the protest. Protesters must aim at specific concessions or legislation they desire; generally, complex problems or complaints that cannot readily be solved by specific governmental action are not good targets for protest activity. Second, the protest must be directed at public officials capable of granting the desired goal. It is difficult to secure concessions if no one is in a position to grant them. Third, the protest leaders must not only organize their masses for protest activity, but they must also simultaneously bargain with public officials for the desired concessions. This implies a division of labor between “organizers” and “negotiators.”

When faced with protest activity, public officials may greet the protesters with smiles and reassurances that they agree with their objectives. They may dispense symbolic satisfaction without actually granting any tangible payoffs. Once the “crisis” is abated, the bargaining leverage of the protest leaders diminishes considerably. Public officials may dispense token satisfactions by responding, with much publicity, to one or more specific cases of injustice, while doing little of a broad-based nature to alleviate conditions. Or public officials may appear to be constrained in their ability to grant protest goals by claiming that they lack the financial resources or legal authority to do anything—the “I-would-help-you-if-I-could-but-I-can’t” pose. Another tactic is to postpone action by calling for further study while offering assurances of sympathy and interest. Finally, public officials may try to discredit protesters by stating or implying that they are violence-prone or unrepresentative of the real aspirations of the people they seek to lead. This tactic is especially effective if the protest involves violence or disruption or if protest leaders have “leftist” or criminal backgrounds.

Protests—peaceful and violent—occur in a particular state and locality. The targeted audience may extend beyond where the protest is taking place (to national or international television audiences). But it is the responsibility of the state or local government serving the area where the protest is occurring to protect the public and to respond when tragedies strike. Sometimes these situations can break the budget. Early estimates of the costs of the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York were in the billions. And even though Congress approved a substantial amount of federal fiscal assistance, the costs to both the State of New York and the City of New York created tremendous fiscal pressures on their budgets.